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SEARCH AND SEIZURE

SEARCH AND SEIZURE INCIDENTAL
TO A LAWFUL ARREST
GREGORY U. EvANs

The fourth amendment to the constitution of the United
States:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
By its terms, premises protected by the fourth amendment
may only be subject to search upon issuance of a proper warrant. To this general rule, a notable exception has been
carved: a search of premises incidental to a lawful arrest
thereon is allowed without a warrant. This exception is not a
new concept, it was founded in the old common law traditions.
As Judge Cardozo once said: "Immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures is not from all searches and seizures,
but from searches and seizures unreasonable in light of
common-law traditions."' Harris v. United States represents
probably the most famous case upholding a search of premises
incidental to a lawful arrest without a search warrant. Here officers armed only with an arrest warrant, arrested the defendant,
Harris, in the living room of his four room dwelling, and
proceeded to search the entire dwelling for evidence of his
crime. In upholding the search and admitting the evidence
seized, the court stated that searches and seizures incidental
to lawful arrest was a practice of ancient origin. They also
said that the practice had become an integral part of the law
enforcement procedure of both the United States and of the
individual states.2 Since the recent Mapp' case excluded
evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure in all courts,
state and federal, this exception to the general prohibition of

I People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583
2 HarXis v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
8Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

(1923).
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the Constitution has begun to play an increasing role in the
work of those involved in the field of criminal law.
To begin the examination of the search of premises incidental to lawful arrest, we will review prerequisites the law
requires for such a search. The search must of course be
lawful.4 For it is the arrest which gives rise to the right of
search, therefore, if the arrest is unlawful the search cannot
be upheld. Secondly the arrest must be bona fide. If the arrest,
even though supported by an arrest warrant or probable cause,
is merely incidental to the furtherance of the main object,
that of a search of the premises, the search is illegal. A good
example of this was presented by the case of Pampinella v.
United States. 5 The defendant in this case was a known criminal
and was being kept under surveillance by Federal officers.
While he was out of town the Federal officers obtained a
warrant for the arrest of both defendant and his wife, charging
them with harboring a criminal. The officers arrested the wife
in the family home and made a search incidental thereto. It
was then that the officers found an illegal gun belonging to
the defendant. Several days later the charges for harboring a
criminal were dropped against both defendant and his wife,
and this action brought against defendant for illegal possession
of the gun. The court refused the gun as evidence saying that
the arrest under which the search had been made was a sham,
and that it was a mere pretext to search for evidence of some
sort to use against the defendant.
Although a valid arrest gives the arresting officer a right to
search the person of the subject arrested, the right to search
the premises incidental to the arrest is not automatic. The
officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that a search
of the premises will uncover objects subject to seizure and
particular to this crime, which have not as yet been discovered. 6
If the officer has no reason to believe that his search will
disclose objects subject to seizure in the crime for which the
arrest was made, the search is classified as exploratory. In the
4 United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); United States v. Festa, 192
F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass. 1960).
5 Pampinella v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. 111. 1955).
6 Supra note 5; United States v. Lerner, 100 F.Supp. 765 (N.D. Calif. 1951).
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case of Kremen v. United States, 7 the arresting officers made a
search of defendant's home incidental to his arrest. He had
no reason to believe that his search would disclose objects
pertaining to the crime for which defendant was arrested. In
the court's words, he was looking for nothing in particular
but for anything which might turn up. The court suppressed
the evidence stating that all searches exploratory in nature
were unreasonable. It matters not what the search reveals, for
in law, a search is good or bad at its inception and success
will not alter its character.8 The rule against searches exploratory in nature, does not however, prevent the officer from
taking visible objects. If on making the arrest on the premises,
the officer sees objects subject to seizure either for the crime
for which the arrest is being made or for any other; he may
lawfully seize them. 9
Then too, the search must always follow the arrest; never
precede it. It is the arrest itself which confers the right to
search the premises., o The cases hold that the search may
begin with the arrest, and may proceed for such a period as
the circumstances indicate would be reasonable.".' Then too
since the arrest is not made under a warrant, it too must meet
certain requirements. The right of an officer to make an arrest
without a warrant is dependent on an almost undefinable
term: probable cause."
Now that we have determined the necessary prerequisites
for a search incidental to a lawful arrest, we must examine
the two possible locations of the arrest: Within the premises
or outside the premises.
Once the officer has made an arrest within the premises, he
must determine whether or not a search thereof would be
7 Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
8 Ibid.
9 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
10Lee v. United States, 232 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v.
Harem, 163 F.Supp. 4 (E.D. Mo. 1958).
11 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
12 For a further discussion of the requirements of an arrest without a warrant,
the reader is referred to Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Also see discussion of the requirements of the Rabinowitz case in Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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deemed reasonable. The United States Supreme Court in the
case of Harrisv. United States, '13 set down a four step test which
they felt should be used to determine the reasonableness of
such a search. The four steps they set down were:
1. It must not be exploratory in nature.
2. The area searched cannot exceed the limits of the
arrested person's control over the premises.
3. The search may be made only for objects subject to
seizure in the crime for which the arrest is made, not those
of another crime.
4. The search must only be as thorough and intensive
as would be appropriate to the nature of the object sought.
The first test is based on the necessity of a reasonable belief
on the officers' part that the result of the search will be some
object pertaining to the crime that defendant was arrested
for. 14 The right to search is based on the arrest and if the
search will do nothing to further the arrest, then there should
be no right.
The second test has been a source of many vigorous debates
in the Supreme Court. The question of how much area around
the individual may lawfully be termed "under his control", is
difficult to answer. In the decided cases, a majority hold that
the individual's control extends to his entire dwelling. 1s
The object of the third step is to limit the officers' search
to those things the courts have held to be lawfully subject to
seizure.
We have held in this regard that not every item may be
seized which is properly inspectable by the Government
1.3 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
14 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Kremen v. United States,

353 U.S. 346 (1957); United States v. Lerner, 100 F.Supp. 765 (N.D.
Calif. 1951).
15Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217 (1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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in the course of a legal search, for example, private papers
desired by the Government merely for use as evidence may
not be seized, no matter how lawful the search which
discovers them, ... However the court continued to say,
Documents used as a means to commit crime are the
proper subjects of search warrants ... , and are seizable
when discovered in a lawful search. 16
Objects lawfully subject to seizure include: weapons of injury and escape, contraband, instrumentalities, and fruits of
crime. The officers' search must be limited to objects of the
crime for which the arrest was made, but if in this search he
discovers objects subject to seizure for yet another crime he
may validly seize them. For as the court said in the case of
Abd v. United States, 1 7 if an object subject to seizure is found by
an officer in the course of a lawful search, it would be senseless
to say he must return it merely because it was not one of the
things he was looking for..
The final test, the thoroughness and intensiveness of
search in comparison with the nature of the object, depends
on many factors. One such factor is the gravity of the offense.
The court would tend to allow a deeper and more penetrating
search if its object were a child who had been kidnapped, but
on the other hand would tend to limit a search for the fruits
of a petty larceny. 18 Then too the size of the object must be
considered. The thoroughness of a search for a stolen automobile and that of one for a small packet of narcotics will
naturally differ.' 9 Time as a measure of the intensiveness of
the search is limited to a reasonable time inferred from the
circumstances. In the Harris case, five officers spent five
hours searching a four room dwelling for two cancelled checks.
The four step test of the Harriscase is extremely useful in
the examination of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It
serves members of both the legal and the law enforcement
16 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 at 234, 238, (1960).

17 Ibid.
I8 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Brinegar v. United States,

338 U.S. 160 (1949).
19 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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professions as a guide to determine the reasonableness of such
a search. As there is no statutory law on the subject and the
case holdings vary so widely, the new interest created by the
Mapp case 2 0 will undoubdy effect the subject of seizure incidental to a lawful arrest and may well add to or subtract from
the Supreme Court's four step test.
The other possible location of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, is the arrest of the defendant outside the premises.
The general rule is that if the defendant is arrested outside
of his dwelling, office, or other premises protected by the
fourth amendment he cannot be taken to these premises for a
search of them incidental to his arrest. Since it is the arrest
that gives rise to the right of search and the premises are not
the place of arrest, these premises cannot be made the subject
of a lawful incidental search.21 If, however, the defendant
voluntarily consents to the search, the search and any seizure
made are lawful and may be used in evidence even over defendant's subsequent protests. 2 2 The case of United States v.
Mitchell23 provides an excellent example of the application of
the above rule. Here the defendant was arrested on the sidewalk outside his home. He was taken to police headquarters
where he made a voluntary confession. He then voluntarily
consented to let officers search his home and in fact accompanied them there for that purpose. The court in admitting
the evidence obtained during this search over defendant's
objection said that the defendant's voluntary consent was a
waiver of the constitutional right to refuse consent.
There has been one notable exception to the general rule
that an arrest outside the premises will not uphold a search
of them incidental to the arrest. In several Federal cases where
the defendant had been apprehended outside the premises,
the court upheld a search thereof saying that the defendant
was -constructively" on the searched premises at the time of
20 Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 3.
21 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); United States v. Coffman,
50 F.Supp. 823 (S.D. Calif. 1943); United States v. Alberti, 120 F.Supp.
171 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
2
2United States v. DuPont, 169 F.Supp. 572 (D. Mass. 1959).
23 332 U.S. 65 (1944).
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the arrest. 2 4 The cases in which this exception has been
recognized are few, and the circumstances under which it was
allowed were quite narrow. In all these cases, the defendants
were in the act of committing the crime at the time the officer
intended to make his arrest, and were leaving that place at
,the time they were in fact arrested. Perhaps the greatest extension of this exception occurred in the case of United States
v. Jackson.25 Narcotics agents were keeping a house under
surveillance at four twenty a.m. on information that a narcotics violation was being committed. The two defendants
emerged from the house, entered an automobile and drove
about a city block before they were overtaken and arrested
by the officers. They were immediately searched; one had
narcotics in his possession and both had keys to the dwelling
they had just left. The agents took both defendants back to
the dwelling and made a search thereof, in the process finding
additional supplies of illegal narcotics. The agents were
armed with neither search nor arrest warrants. On considering
the motion to suppress the evidence, the court said that since
the defendants controlled the premises, had emerged therefrom immediately before their arrest, and the search was confined to evidence of the narcotics violation for which they
were arrested the search was not unreasonable. Even though
the arrest was made a block away, the search was contemporaneous with the arrest and in the course of the same transaction. -The court did say, however, that the hour, four
twenty a.m. had influenced their decision as they were aware
of the impossibility of obtaining a search warrant at this time.
The officer cannot deliberately delay arresting the defendant
in order to make a search of his dwelling incidental thereto.
In a nineteen fifty Federal court case, 22 officers trailed defendant down a quiet street, rejecting many suitable opportunities to arrest him. When he entered his home officers
followed, arresting him and making a search of his home
incidental thereto. In terming the search unreasonable, the
court said that it appeared that the only reason the officers
Kelly v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932); Clifton v. United
States, 224 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955); Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d
55 (5th Cir. 1958).
25 149 F.Supp 937 (D. D.C. 1957).
24

2

6 McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cit. 1950).
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delayed their arrest was for the purpose of searching his home
to obtain evidence to convict him. They continued, saying,
that this purposeful delay violated the defendant's rights
under the fourth amendment. If, however, the officer had as a
secondary purpose, the desire to search the defendant's home,
and there is no proof that he deliberately bypassed a suitable
opportunity outside the premises, the search will be upheld. 2 7
Of course if the officer finds the defendant outside the
premises and lures him back into them by means of misrepresentation or fraud, a search of the premises incidental thereto
would be unreasonable. 28
Since a search of premises incidental to a lawful arrest
without a search warrant is an exception to a constitutional
requirement, the courts have tended to limit, and apply
strict standards to its use. Some of the leading members of
the legal profession have viewed this exception with skepticism,
while others have vigorously opposed it. 29 Though it has
been opposed and strictly interpreted, this exception holds
an increasing place of importance in the law on search and
seizure. With the recent Mapp case 3" requiring evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure to be excluded in all
courts, state and federal, this exception has tended to be
relied on more and more by law enforcement officers. Members of the bar in agreement with it or not, must become
familiar with this exception and its requirements for the best
interests of their clients.
Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1959).
28 United States v. Alberti, 120 F.Supp. 171 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
29 See J. Frankfurter's dissents in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
30 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27

